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Land Use Control Through Covenants
By DAvID E. MACELLVEN*
COVENANTS HAVE long been used for purposes of controlling the
use and occupancy of land. Such controls relate to the purposes of use,
such as residential contrasted to commercial or industrial, and also the
type, style, materials and location of buildings or other improvements.
Covenants relating to occupancy of land frequently had been used to
control or restrict classes or races of persons who could occupy land.
Such class controls are no longer judicially enforceable, if not totally
void.
The widest modem usage of covenants for such control purposes
has been in connection with the development and sale of land for resi-
dential subdivision purposes. Industrial and commercial developments
of land have similarly been controlled through the use of covenants.
In turn such commercial and industrial usages have been the subject
of preventive controls through the imposition of restrictive covenants
on land designed to be devoted solely to residential development.
It should be noted that any land use control through covenants is
a matter of private contract. The use of land is also subject to public
control by zoning ordinances under the police power. In addition both
use and occupancy of land have been the subject of control through
the imposition of conditions subsequent involving forfeiture of title
upon breach. Neither such zoning regulations nor control through con-
ditions will be discussed here.
For purposes of distinguishment, at least as between covenants and
conditions, it should be noted that being matters of private contract,
enforcement is solely a private right as contrasted to the "public offi-
cial" enforcement of zoning regulations under the police power. The
main distinction with relation to enforcement as between covenants
and conditions is that covenants can be enforced in equity either by an
original grantor (subdivision developer) or by lot owners in the tract
as between themselves. A condition, however, and the enforcement of
a forfeiture or reverter for breach can be enforced only by the grantor.
A covenant, as a matter of general definition, not necessarily re-
lated to covenants affecting use or occupancy of land, is said to be "an
* LL.B., University of Michigan; Vice-President and Counsel, Western Title Insur-
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agreement duly made to do or not to do a particular act. It is a species
of express contract, and is a contract of a special nature."'
Historically, covenants have been used in transfers of land and
have been the subject of much litigation. Covenants of varying kinds
can be used in a single conveyance of a single parcel of land. We are
here concerned chiefly, if not only, with the use of covenants for pur-
poses of controlling use and occupancy of multiple parcels of land such
as the lots in a tract or subdivision. Within the area of this usage of
so-called restrictions or restrictive covenants, the commonly used and
understood reference, whether contained in each deed in the tract or
a recorded declaration of restrictions, is "Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions." This is further often reduced for brevity to "C.C. & R."
This discussion will be limited, as above indicated, to that portion and
application of such restrictions as are commonly referred to as "Re-
strictive Covenants."
For purposes of this usage of covenants, there is a distinction be-
tween so-called real covenants and personal covenants. Many types
of covenants, even in connection with land, are so framed, or have
been judicially construed, to be personal covenants binding upon the
immediate grantee only. Obviously, for the continuing protection of
lands in the hands of subsequent grantees, the covenants would have
to be deemed and be enforceable as real covenants.
Covenants Running with the Land
The ordinary concept of covenants which will be enforceable
against future owners, in addition to the immediate grantee in the in-
strunient creating the covenants, is that of covenants running with the
land. Such covenants have been in generality defined as follows: "A
covenant running with the land is one so relating to the land, or which
so touches and concerns the land itself that its benefit or obligation
passes with the ownership, irrespective of the consent of subsequent
owners."2 This immediately leads into a problem encountered in Cali-
fornia in the use of covenants in land control. This arises out of Civil
Code sections which have been described as "somewhat unusual."
Civil Code section 1460 provides that certain covenants "contained
in grants of estates in real property, are appurtenant to such estates,
and pass with them," and that "such covenants are said to run with
the land." Section 1462 provides that a covenant contained in a grant
of an estate in real property "which is made for the direct benefit of
the property" runs with the land. (Emphasis added.)
121 C.J.S. Covenants § 1 (1940).
221 C.J.S. Covenants § 54 (1940).
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It is immediately apparent that only those covenants which benefit
land will technically run in California, 3 whereas the desired future and
continuing effect of restrictive covenants is the ability to impose cove-
nants which will burden the land as to use and occupancy.
4
The foregoing statements as to the inability to make burdensome
covenants run with the title to land refer to such covenants contained
in "grants of estates in real property." A further Civil Code section,
1468, makes possible the enforcement of burdensome covenants as
running with the land if they are cast as covenants in an agreement
between owners of land as distinguished from attempting to impose
such covenants in a grant or conveyance. The effect of 1468 in agree-
ments as contrasted to conveyances has been judicially discussed in
California. 5 In addition, although not directly involved in restriction
controls in subdivision development, sections 1469 and 1470 were
added to the Civil Code in 1953 to provide that covenants in leases
to do (affirmative) or refrain from doing (negative) certain acts are
enforceable against successive owners (of the leased land).
In connection with the foregoing reference to the affirmative and
negative effect of covenants, it should be noted that land restrictions
have been considered as, or likened to, negative easements. An affirm-
ative easement permits the easement owner or one entitled to enforce
or use an easement (the owner of the dominant tenement or dominant
estate) to do or perform acts on the servient estate or servient tene-
ment, the land burdened by the easement. A negative easement per-
mits the owner of a dominant estate or tenement to control acts by the
owner of the servient land on the servient tenement or estate. Such
control is generally the ability to prevent the doing of stated things on
the servient land by the owner thereof. A further distinction is that
in the exercise of an affirmative easement the easement owner enters
upon or passes through the servient land, whereas, in the enforcement
of a negative easement, the easement owner generally does not enter
the servient land, but simply prevents the owner thereof from certain
acts on the servient land. Building restrictions have been judicially
referred to in California as being in the nature of a negative easement
or equitable servitude.6
It has been above noted that use control covenants of the nature
under discussion are generally found embodied in "covenants, condi-
tions and restrictions." In multiple lot or properties restriction of land,
3 Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P,2d 490 (1940).
4 See generally, 2 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property §§ 205-211
(7th ed. 1960).
5 Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940); Chandler v.
Smith, 170 Cal. App. 2d 118, 338 P.2d 522 (1959).
6 Sackett v. Los Angeles City School Dist., 118 Cal. App. 254, 5 P.2d 23 (1931).
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two basic methods are used. One is to set forth in full the restriction
provisions in the deeds of each lot in the restricted tract. The second
method is for the selling developer to record the restriction provisions
in the form of a Declaration of Restrictions. If this method is used the
imposition of the restrictions on the land is accomplished by references
in each of the deeds to the Declaration of Restrictions.
In some forms of restriction provisions only covenants are used. It
would be possible to attempt to restrict land use through the medium
only of conditions. It is frequently found, however, that both forms
are combined in one set of restrictions. As above indicated, enforce-
ment for violations of conditions can be only by the original grantor-
developer, but the enforcement of covenants in a general plan of
restrictions is available to the various lot owners between themselves
and against each other.
It has been pointed out that technically restrictive covenants which
burden land cannot be legally enforced in California as running cove-
nants because of the fact that such covenants generally do not benefit
the land conveyed. Burdensome covenants, of course, can be enforced
against the original or first grantee.
Equitable Servitudes
Equity has found a remedy, however, through the medium of the
enforcement of burdensome restrictive covenants as equitable servi-
tudes. The doctrine of equitable servitudes permits the continuing
enforcement of burdensome covenants against successors in interest
of the original grantee. This enforcement is based on the equitable
theory that if a subsequent grantee takes with knowledge or notice
of a valid agreement concerning the use of land he cannot equitably
refuse to perform.7 This knowledge or notice can be actual, but the
doctrine is also enforceable on the basis of constructive notice arising
from the appearance of the restriction provisions in the recorded chain
of title." The doctrine of estoppel has also been invoked in restriction
litigation.9
To make restrictive covenants which burden rather than benefit
land enforceable as equitable servitudes there are certain requirements
in declaring and imposing the restrictions. This is necessary in order
that the restrictions can be equitably enforceable by each lot owner
in the tract against the other owners. These requirements are present
whether the method of imposition is through the embodiment of the
restrictions in each of the deeds or the above referred to recording of
7 Bryan v. Grosse, 155 Cal. 132, 99 Pac. 499 (1909).
8 Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 269 Pac. 660 (1928).
9 Smith v. Rasqui, 176 Cal. App. 2d 514, 1 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1959).
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a declaration of restrictions and the later incorporation of the declara-
tion into the separate conveyances.
It should be noted here that the restrictions, if they otherwise
qualify for enforcement, can be imposed on all of the lots through the
medium of one deed. This is true whether the restrictions are em-
bodied in the deed itself or incorporated into the deed from a prior
recorded declaration of restrictions.
The basic requirement, in either form of imposition, is that the re-
strictions must describe all the land in the tract and must clearly de-
clare that they are intended for the benefit of all of the land. This
results in what is referred to as an enforceable "general plan" of re-
striction.10 It is not sufficient to alone describe the area and recite the
restrictions without an express statement that the declaration is in-
tended for the benefit of all the described lands. 1 It is better, and less
vulnerable to attack, for the imposing declaration to specifically de-
scribe the lands in the restricted area, either by a perimeter metes and
bounds description or by reference to all of the lots in a subdivision
map (such as lots one to fifty-six inclusive on that certain map etc.),
although it has been held that a more generalized form of description
can be sustained. This would, however, seem to invite litigation. This
occurred in connection with a restriction plan in which the description
simply referred to "other property . .. still retained by grantor."'
2
The basic restriction case is Werner v. Graham,13 which has been
almost invariably cited and followed in all cases involving this subject
since its decision in 1919. The principle as set forth in Werner is as
follows: 14
It is undoubted that when the owner of a subdivided tract conveys
the various parcels in the tract by deeds containing appropriate lan-
guage imposing restrictions on each parcel as part of a general plan
of restrictions common to all the parcels and designed for their mu-
tual benefit, mutual equitable servitudes are thereby created in favor
of each parcel as against all the others. The agreement between the
grantor and each grantee in such case as expressed in the instruments
between them is both that the parcel conveyed shall be subject to
restrictions in accordance with the plan for the benefit of all the other
parcels and also that all other parcels shall be subject to such restric-
tions for its benefit. In such a case the mutual servitudes spring into
existence as between the first parcel conveyed and the balance of the
parcels at the time of the first conveyance. As each conveyance fol-
10 Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 472, 101 P.2d 1099 (1940).
11 Burt v. Hellman, 92 Cal. App. 446, 268 Pac. 436 (1928).
"2 Moore v. Ojai Improvement Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d 124, 313 P.2d 47 (1957).
13 Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919).
14 Id. at 183, 183 Pac. at 949.
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lows, the burden and the benefit of the mutual restrictions imposed
by preceding conveyances as between the particular parcel conveyed
and those previously conveyed pass as an incident of the ownership
of the parcel, and similar restrictions are created by the conveyance
as between the lot conveyed and the lots still retained by the original
owner. (Emphasis added.)
The following constitutes an example of the type of language
which has been used in numerous recorded declarations of restriction
or could be used alternatively in the deeds themselves if the recorded
declaration method is not used. It should be noted that this form in-
dicates the use only of covenants. If in addition a declaration or plan
of restrictions is to involve conditions subsequent and forfeiture for
breach, the language would have to be appropriately enlarged.
WHEREAS, is the owner of the following described
property:
(Complete legal description of the property, such as by refer-
ence to numbered lots on an identified subdivision map.)
WHEREAS, it is the desire and intention of the owner to sell the
property described above and to impose on it mutual, beneficial re-
strictions under a general plan or scheme of improvement for the
benefit of all the lands in the tract and the future owners of those
lands;
NOW, THEREFORE, the owner hereby declares that all of the
property described above is held and shall be held, conveyed, hypoth-
ecated or encumbered, leased, rented, used, occupied, and improved
subject to the following limitations, restrictions, and covenants, all
of which are declared and agreed to be in furtherance of a plan for
the subdivision, improvement, and sale of the lands and are estab-
lished and agreed upon for the purpose of enhancing and protecting
the value, desirability, and attractiveness of the lands and every part
thereof. All of the limitations, restrictions, and covenants shall run
with the land and shall be binding on all parties having or acquiring
any right, title, or interest in the described lands or any part thereof.
It is to be noted that this form contains a statement of intent that
the covenants shall run with the land. In the light of the above dis-
cussion this probably has no other legal effect than to declare, as a
matter of constructive notice in the record title, that the intent is to
create enforceable continuing restrictions. Enforcement can then be-
come available through the doctrine of equitable servitudes.
If the declaration method is used and the restrictions are not set
forth in each deed, although incorporated therein by reference, the
following is a type of paragraph which has been used for such incor-
porating and imposing.
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This conveyance is made subject to covenants, conditions, and re-
strictions contained in a declaration executed by the grantor herein,
recorded , 19_, in book . page -, Offi-
cial Records of County, California, and these covenants,
conditions, and restrictions are made a part of this conveyance.
If the imposition of the restrictions is through the medium of set-
ting them forth in full in a deed, with the necessary perimeter or other
description and declaration of intent to create general plan, the re-
strictions are imposed on the tract by the first such deed of a single
lot which is recorded. If the declaration method is used, imposition
occurs only upon the recording of the first deed which refers to and
incorporates the declaration.15
Restrictions-Creation, Alteration, Effect and Enforcement
For covenants to exist, there must be a conveyance, transfer or con-
tract involving a covenantor and a covenantee (grantee and grantor).
A recorded declaration of restrictions is only a unilateral declaration
of intent on the part of the subdivider to restrict the lands upon later
conveyance. It has been judicially stated "easements and restrictions
on real estate can be created only by grant .... So long as a tract re-
mains in one ownership, there can be no dominant and servient tene-
ments as between different portions, and the owner may rearrange the
quality of any possible servitude."" The quoted language of Murry
v. Lovell 1 again indicates the easement theory through the reference
to "dominant and servient tenements."
The result of this is that after the recording of a declaration but
before imposition by conveyance of any of the lands, the subdivider
or developer can, as he may see fit, change or modify to enlarge, re-
duce, or completely revoke his declared intent. This was a commonly
accepted theory in the title industry even prior to Murry, and the case
confirms that concept of restriction imposition.
The measure of the necessary extent of incorporating reference or
language in the deeds was indicated in an early case. A declaration of
restrictions was recorded, but the deeds contain no specific reference
to the declaration or any other intent to restrict. The deeds were
simply made subject to any and all matters of record. This deed lan-
guage was held to be a sufficient reference to the declaration of restric-
tions in Burkhardt v. Lofton.' The commonly accepted practice,
". Smith v. Rasqui, 176 Cal. App. 2d 514, 1 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1959); Murry v. Lovell,
132 Cal. App. 2d 30, 281 P.2d 316 (1955).
16 Murry v. Lovell, supra note 15, at 34, 281 P.2d at 318 (1955).
17 Ibid.
"s 63 Cal. App. 2d 230, 146 P.2d 720 (1944).
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however, is not to depend on any such generalized or all-inclusive
reference to matters of record, but to make specific reference to and
specific incorporation of the recorded declaration in the deeds.
In Burkhardt, it was also held that restrictions on use and occu-
pancy are not void because of being unlimited as to time. The distinc-
tion was drawn between restrictions on ownership or conveying of
land as being void restraints on alienation, and the permissive unlim-
ited restrictions on use and occupancy of the land.19
A situation occasionally arises in which some lots in a development
may be conveyed expressly subject to restrictions, while other lots
have been cbnveyed without express restriction. If this occurs, in the
absence of any general plan of restrictions imposed on the whole tract
under the rules of Werner v. Graham, the servitudes cannot be legally
enforced against the grantee of a lot conveyed without restriction.20
There is authority, however, even in such absence of declaration and
imposition, for equitable enforcement against a grantee who can be
established as having taken with knowledge or notice of the general
restrictive plan.2 1 This principle of enforcement has, however, if based
on grounds of estoppel, been limited by a decision that "the estoppel
must be mutual and reciprocal, and that either both parties must be
bound or neither party is bound."
22
Another type of restriction or attempted restriction of lands, but
without conveyance or declaration or express imposition of restrictions,
is found in the recording of subdivision maps showing such control
matters as "building set back lines." Such showings on recorded maps
are, of course, in no sense of the word covenants, and it would seem
that any such attempted controls could be enforced only on such
grounds as estoppel or equitable servitude based upon knowledge and
notice. The question has not been clearly and decisively ruled on in
California, and there is apparent conflict in other jurisdictions.
If lots in a subdivision or any other area of land intended to be
restricted have been subjected to a properly created and properly im-
posed general plan of restrictions, enforcement in the manner and
under the theories above outlined is available to the various lot owners
as between themselves. In addition, if the original subdivider has not
parted with title to all the lands in the restricted area, he has a right
of enforcement of the general plan for the benefit and protection of any
lands which he retains in the area. Such retained lands are in turn
subject to the restrictions for the benefit of the lands he has conveyed.
20 Ibid.
20 Moe v. Gier, 116 Cal. App. 403, 2 P.2d 852 (1931).
21 Martin v. Holm, 197 Cal. 733, 242 Pac. 718 (1925).
22 Smith v. Rasqui, 176 Cal. App. 2d 514, 1 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1959).
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If he no longer owns any land in the restricted area, his rights of en-
forcement terminate.
23
Although we are concerned here only with the use of covenants
to enforce restrictions, it should be noted that Kent v. Koch 24 cites
other judicial pronouncements that when the subdivider retains no
lands in the restricted area he can no longer enforce forfeiture upon
breach of conditions if the conditions are a part of a general plan of
restrictions for the benefit of the entire area.
It is not intended to discuss manner or method of enforcement
here, but it should be noted that, assuming properly created and en-
forceable restrictions, the various lot owners may enforce restrictions
against each other, or against the original subdivider if he continues
to own land in the restricted area, through such remedies as injunction
against violation, actions to enforce removal of violations, or an action
for damages to the plaintiff's property through the effect of violations.
If the effectiveness of restrictions is not limited as to time in the
original declaration, they are, in effect, perpetual. As above indicated,
this constitutes no invalidity of general plan restrictions. It sometimes
is provided in restrictions, however, that they shall exist only until a
certain date. It can also be provided that the restrictions can be con-
tinued beyond such a date, for specified periods, upon the recording
of written election by stated percentages of the land owners in the area
of such intent to continue the restrictions. An alternative provision is
sometimes used, under which the restrictions will be automatically ex-
tended for stated periods, such as five years or ten years, unless a sim-
ilar percentage of the owners in the area record a termination of the
restrictions.
Restrictions also sometimes provide that they can be altered or
amended, either by removal of some provisions or the addition of new
provisions, through a recorded contractual agreement by stated per-
centages of the owners and encumbrancers of the land in the restricted
area. It is, of course, true that even without any provision in the re-
strictions themselves the owners and encumbrancers of all land af-
fected thereby can, by recorded agreement, alter or amend or entirely
cancel restrictions in any desired manner. This is purely a matter of
the right of private contract.
In addition to the foregoing effecting of restrictions by contractual
agreements, there has also been frequent resort to equitable actions
to alter or change restrictions, and even to completely free property
from the effect of the restrictions. This generally takes the form of an
23 Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958).
24 Ibil.
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action seeking an equitable decision by the court that restrictions are
no longer enforceable. The underlying theory of actions of this type
is that conditions in the area have so changed that it would no longer
be equitably proper to enforce the restrictions. The entire restrictive
plan is for the benefit of the land in the area, and if a proper showing
can be made of the fact that enforcement of the restrictions would no
longer benefit the land, a decree in equity as to such termination
would seem proper.
25
Any such action, of course, must join all parties whose rights would
be affected, although there has been usage made in this area of the
so-called "representative" action. In that type of proceeding a limited
number of the owners involved are made parties under the theory that
the rights of all owners in the area are the same and that all owners will
be adequately represented by the joinder of less than all of them.
There may be some obvious questions here, as appear in all such
representative actions, as to whether the rights of parties not specifi-
cally named are truly and adequately represented by the joinder of
only such a limited number. One of the chief functions of this kind of
action, however, is to establish as a matter of record through the judg-
ment that the factual situations existing in the area are such as to
preclude any maintainable assertion that the judgment of the court
concerning the enforceability of the restrictions could be successfully
attacked by other parties not specifically named.
A natural corollary to the right to obtain affirmative judicial pro-
nouncement that restrictions are no longer enforceable is the use of the
showing of such changed conditions as defense to an action to enforce.
It should also be noted that although the effects of restrictions cre-
ated by private imposition have no direct relation to or connection with
land use control by zoning ordinances, the existence or changing of
zoning regulations as to the property in question has been used as evi-
dence in the equity type of law suit.26
Another factor, in addition to the effects on equitable enforcement
of change of character of neighborhood and the related changes of
zoning controls, may enter into either affirmative attempts to declare
restrictions to be no longer enforceable or as defense to attempted en-
forcement. There sometimes is encountered a situation in which, with-
in the restricted tract itself, there have been repeated violations in
25Key v. McCabe, 54 Cal. 2d 736, 8 Cal. Rptr. 425, 356 P.2d 169 (1960); Wolff v.
Fallon, 44 CaL 2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955); Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2
P.2d 782 (1931); Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1959); For-
man v. Hancock, 3 Cal. App. 2d 291, 39 P.2d 249 (1934).
26 Key v. McCabe, 54 Cal. 2d 736, 8 Cal. Rptr. 425, 356 P.2d 169 (1960); Hirsch v.
Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1959); Rice v. Heggy, 158 Cal. App. 2d
89, 322 P.2d 53 (1958).
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greater or lesser degree. The effect of such continuing violations, un-
objected to by other owners, has been given consideration in equity
law suits concerning restriction enforcement.27 In one case, repeated
violations of some portions of the restrictions, such as set back distances
from street lines, resulted in judicial modification of the set back pro-
visions but the court ordered continuing enforcement of other restric-
tive provisions. 28 In other cases violations of restriction provisions by
one owner have been held to prevent that owner from in turn enforc-
ing restrictions against the other owners in the restricted tract.
29
In addition to problems of mutual enforcement as between owners,
situations are sometimes encountered in which restriction provisions
are sought to be enforced against condemning governmental agencies
or bodies. An example of such a situation would involve the use for
school or such other public purposes of lands within an area restricted
solely to residential use. This problem has been considered in at least
two California casesA0 The courts there held that restrictive covenants
are not enforceable against property acquired for public use. A similar
result followed in a federal case.31
Enforcement in the courts of restrictive covenants is clearly an
equitable matter. Enforcement will be denied, however, if the effect
would be to violate public policy. In one case enforcement of restric-
tions against the sale of liquor was denied upon a finding that the
intent of the restriction was to create a monopoly as to the sale of
liquor in the restricted area.2 The case involved restrictive conditions
rather than covenants, but it would seem that the courts would apply
the same reasoning in denying enforcement of covenants, if found to
be designed for such a purpose.
Restrictions based upon race or other group classification had gen-
erally been held to be enforceable until a series of decisions in the
United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court estab-
lishing the law to be that restrictions of any kind based upon classes
or conditions of color, race or creed were no longer enforceable. The
previous doctrine of enforceability in California was evidenced by a
decision as late as 1944.33 In 1948, a lower court California judgment
27 Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal. App. 2d 682, 139 P.2d 976 (1943); Hanna v. Rodeo-
Vallejo Ferry Co., 89 Cal. App. 462, 265 Pac. 287 (1928).
28 Rice v. Heggy, 158 Cal. App. 2d 89, 322 P.2d 53 (1958).
29 Bryant v. Whitney, 178 Cal. 640, 174 Pac. 32 (1918); Diederichsen v. Sutch,
47 Cal. App. 2d 646, 118 P.2d 863 (1941).
30 Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 268 Pac. 1080 (1930); Sackett v. Los
Angeles City School Dist., 118 Cal. App. 254, 5 P.2d 23 (1931).
31 United States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622 (C.C. R.I. 1899).
32 Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 92 Pac. 1022 (1907).
33 Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal. 2d 818, 151 P.2d 260 (1944).
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enforcing restrictions was reversed 4 citing the then current decisions
of the United States Supreme Court.35 A series of California Supreme
Court memorandum decisions was entered citing and following the
United States Supreme Court rule.36
The theory of the Supreme Court decisions was not that private
restrictive agreements or covenants, based on race or other class dis-
tinctions, are void as such. The decisions only determined that it would
be against the constitutional provisions to permit enforcement of such
restrictions through judicial pronouncement. The refusal to enforce
restrictions in the courts was also extended to the preventing of an
action for damages for violation of the covenants.ar
The effect of these decisions was simply that race or other class
restrictions were not void as such, but could be voluntarily complied
with by those concerned, although they could not be judicially en-
forced. The restrictions, therefore, would remain effective of record as
against the title to the land in question.
The California legislature in the 1961 session, however, added two
new sections to the Civil Code. The apparent effect of these provisions
is that any restrictions of the class set forth are void in the absolute
sense. Section 53 as so added to the Civil Code provides that any pro-
vision in a written instrument which restricts the conveying, encum-
bering or leasing of real property on the basis of "a specified race, color,
religion, ancestry or national origin, is void." Such restrictions as to
conveying or otherwise affecting the title to land have always gen-
erally been considered to be void as restraints on alienation. The sec-
tion further provides that any restriction or prohibition "directly or
indirectly" by way of covenant or condition, upon "the acquisition, use
or occupation" of property on a similar class basis is also void.
The 1961 legislature also added section 782 to the Civil Code pro-
viding that "whether executed before or after the effective date of this
section" any provision in any deed of real property in California is
void if it purports to restrict the sale, lease, rental, use or occupancy of
property to persons "of a particular racial or ethnic group." This new
section covers any such provision which attempts to accomplish this
result through "payment of a penalty, forfeiture, reverter, or other-
wise." (Emphasis added.)
34 Cumings v. Hokr, 31 Cal. 2d 844, 193 P.2d 742 (1948).
35 Shelly v. Kraemer (McGhee v. Sipes), 334 U.S. 1 (1948), Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d
466; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
36 32 Cal. 2d 892-96, 197 P.2d 161-62 (1948).
37 Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 247 P.2d 99 (1952).
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